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Abstract 
This paper examines the exploitation and management of gold mining in the western region of Côte 
d’Ivoire and the associated local social tensions and conflicts. Taking a historical sociological analysis, 
the paper shows how good governance and conflict resolution initiatives (and in particular the 2014 
Mining Code and the subsequent locally mediated governance arrangement), combined with the 
privatisation of the mine and its security, are leading to conflict. The study, which is predominantly 
qualitative, employs a mixed-methods methods approach, drawing upon direct observation, 20 semi-
structured interviews for stakeholder mapping and ten focus groups with gold panners, mine managers 
and local village populations. Quantitative analysis was conducted with 154 heads of households in the 
project area, i.e. the eight villages directly affected by gold mining activities. The content analysis 
revealed that the rationale for expropriation during the initial phase of mining was never accepted at 
the local level for economic and spiritual reasons. This resistance has increased following the 
establishment of a new mining administration and the new mining code. 
Keywords: Mining conflicts, impacted villages, gold panning, formalisation, 2014 Mining Code, Côte 
d’Ivoire 
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1   Introduction 
A boom in extractive industry investment in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly in gold, is currently under way. 
Côte d’Ivoire is a country rich in minerals – gold, iron, diamonds, manganese and many others – with a 
mining potential that includes more than 30 per cent of West Africa’s Biriminian greenstone belt 
(MOGED 2015: 1). The belt is a mineral geological formation that extends from Ghana to Senegal. 
However, the growth of mining activities has been relatively limited until very recently due to high 
extraction costs and successive government policies in promoting principally agricultural sector 
development, especially cocoa production. Mining contributed only 1 per cent of GDP in 1986. This 
proportion increased to about 5 per cent in 2015 (Handloff and Duval 1991; Kouamé et al. 2015). This 
surge is explained by both the increased demand for resources from the world’s emerging economies 
and the war economy. The country suffered from a civil war between 2002 and 2011, and mining was 
used both on a large scale to finance the war and on an artisanal scale to sustain livelihoods. Artisanal 
mining is a low-tech, labour-intensive mineral extraction and processing practice (in our particular case 
also referred to as gold panning). Mining (artisanal and industrial) is considered an important livelihood 
strategy in the post-conflict context. However, mining activity regularly leads to conflicts between young 
people and the government and between villages and government-authorised mining companies, 
around gold panning, work opportunities in the mines and the revenue generated by the industrial 
mine. 
The 2014 Mining Code aims to formalise relationships between mining companies and the local people, 
through the creation of the Comité de Développement Local Minier (CDLM) (Mining Local Development 
Committee). This paper looks at how locally formalised governance agreements for ‘sustainable 
development’ create conflict and violence at the local level by stigmatising informal structures of power 
and practice (Hilson 2013). For the purposes of this paper, formalisation entails the legalisation of all 
the provisions and requirements set forth in the Ivoirian 2014 Mining Code. The paper examines the 
current debates around mining governance transitions through several lenses: formalisation, 
privatisation and debates around marginalisation (Ferguson 2006; Fisher 2007; Fraser 2000) and the 
relationship between the mining operator and the gold panners (Hilson and Yakovleva 2007). It goes 
beyond the existing debates on the formalisation of the artisanal mining sector and its ineffectiveness 
(Fisher 2007; Maconachie and Hilson 2011; Marshall and Veiga 2017; Siwale and Siwale 2017), looking 
at the broader informal/formal interface and relations between the mining company, the government, 
the customary institutions and the gold panners. It highlights especially the limits of a particular framing 
of sustainability around good governance as a conflict resolution mechanism to address state–
community–mining relations. Good governance is represented here by the creation of a local 
development committee modelled on national and international standards in mining governance. A 
mining development plan was drawn up by the mining company in consultation with neighbouring 
communities, administrative authorities and elected officials. This process, which aimed at creating 
more transparency and accountability, has in fact ended up creating more conflict and tensions between 
the mining company and the various local actors in Ity (Côte d’Ivoire). 
The study was based on both qualitative research and a quantitative survey conducted in May 2017. 
The sample was composed of 20 people for individual interviews, including three institutional actors – 
the prefect, sub-prefect and resident mayor of the municipality of Zouan-Hounien, eight gold panners, 
two members of the mine in question – the community relations manager and a mine employee, two 
village chiefs from the villages of Ity and Ouyatouo, two youth presidents of the affected villages, one 
representative of the women of one of the villages. Two informal interviews were conducted with a 
prefectoral authority and a resident of the commune of Zouan-Hounien in order to cross-check the 
information. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, ten focus groups were set up with gold 
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panners, mine managers and local village populations, and a survey was carried out with 154 heads of 
households in the area of the eight villages directly affected by gold mining activities. 
The paper first provides a background to the mining site and the locally negotiated agreement between 
the mining company and local communities relating to gold panning. It then discusses why this 
agreement has not been followed by the local communities, emphasising cultural and historical 
implications around land tenure and livelihoods, and the impact of the 2014 Mining Code and new 
practices employed by the new mining administration. 
2   A short livelihood history of Ity: the discovery of gold and its local 
communities 
Our site is the first gold mining site in Côte d’Ivoire. Ity is a village located in the west of Côte d’Ivoire, 
in the Danané region. It is 740 km from the city of Abidjan. The city of Zouan-Hounien is 15km from the 
Ity site. In terms of ethnic dynamics, the Dan (Yacouba), the We (Gwere and Wobe) and the Toura have 
all occupied this mountainous region since the eighteenth century (Schwartz 1971: 48–9). In addition to 
these peoples, there are also Malinke from the neighbouring Bafing and Worodougou regions, Senufo 
(great allies of the Dan), Akan and, above all, Baoulé, primarily originating from the centre and the east 
of the country. In addition to these Ivorian populations, there is also a large community from other 
countries belonging to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), mostly from Burkina 
Faso and Mali. Migration to this region increased substantially in the 1980s when the region became 
home to the national coffee and cocoa plantation sector. Today, planters have reached the western 
border of the country, posing a threat to (on occasion, protected) forest reserves (Bossard 2003). This 
economic development was driven mainly by external forces (Europeans, Ivorians from outside the 
region and Africans from other countries); local populations played a secondary role (Dozon 2011). The 
development of the plantation economy resulted in large inter-rural migrations, both from east to west 
and from savannah to forest regions. This phenomenon was also accompanied by significant 
urbanisation (Beauchemin 2000).  
Copper and gold were discovered near the village of Ity in the 1950s. After several technical and 
economic studies, the Société des Mines d’Ity (SMI) was created by decree in June 1983 between the 
Ivorian State, represented by Société d’Etat pour le Développement Minier de la Côte D’ivoire (SODEMI) 
and Compagnie Française des Mines (COFRAMINES), a subsidiary of the Bureau de Recherches 
Géologiques et Minières (Geological and Mining Research Bureau) (SMI 2012). The concession was 
granted in 1987 and mining began in 1991 (UNEP 2015: 115). Since the State of Côte d’Ivoire granted 
the SMI exploration and exploitation permits for the Ity gold mines, it has become the sole owner of 
this domain (SEKA 1989, cited by Zénobe 2010). Since 1991, several administrations have followed one 
another and the SMI was privatised in 1998. In 1993, Mine Or SA succeeded COFRAMINES, which was 
acquired by Normandy La Source in 1997. In March 2002, Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires 
(COGEMA) acquired the shares of Normandy La Source. In 2006, it transferred its shares (51 per cent) 
to Compagnie Minière Or (COMINOR), a subsidiary of La Mancha. In 2007, as part of the renewal of the 
operating permit (PE 26), the Ivorian State obtained 10 per cent of the shares (5 per cent of COMINOR 
and 5 per cent of SODEMI) of the SMI. SODEMI then held 44.1 per cent of the shares of SMI and 
COMINOR held 45.9 per cent (SMI 2012). With the arrival of Endeavour Mining Financial Group in 2011, 
there has been a reconfiguration of the company’s shareholding structure. The majority of the shares 
of the SMI now belong to this Canadian group which, since March 2017, has held 80 per cent of the 
shares, while 10 per cent belong to the State of Côte d’Ivoire and 10 per cent to DYD International 
Holding Limited, a financial group that belongs to footballer Didier Drogba. The mine is situated near 
the Guinean and Liberian borders and attracts a workforce from these countries and from as far as 
Ghana. 
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Before the exploitation of the mine, the region had been relatively marginalised since the colonial 
period. At independence, despite being home to nearly 13 per cent of the country’s population, the 
region received only a tiny proportion of private investment (1.5 per cent) and a very small amount of 
public investment (2.6 per cent) (Ministère du Plan 1964). The region remained marginalised under the 
presidency of Félix Houphouët Boigny (1960–93) with a very limited transport network. This started to 
change from the late 1980s when the region became central to the production of cocoa and Côte 
d’Ivoire became the world’s biggest producer of cocoa beans. 
Before mining, the main livelihood of the local population was agriculture. The smallholder coffee and 
cocoa plantation economy expanded in forested Côte d’Ivoire in areas of low population. Its 
development therefore relied on the arrival of immigrants, sometimes in large numbers, from 
neighbouring countries, especially Burkina Faso but also Mali and Guinea, as well as internal migrants 
from the Baoulé region. This was not without consequences. No rules or regulations were established, 
especially after Houphouët-Boigny’s famous slogan, ‘the land belongs to those who put it to good use’. 
Tensions and conflicts between natives and migrants frequently occur over land disputes as a result of 
these land transfers to migrants (see Allouche and Zadi Zadi 2013; Chauveau 2000). 
Access to employment with the mining company and compensation mechanisms for the impacted 
villages through negotiations between the traditional chiefs and the mining company have been an 
important source of livelihood since the gold mining operations started in the early 1990s. It is important 
to note that local livelihoods had deteriorated as a result of the civil war in the country that lasted 
between 2000 and 2010. The region had been labelled the ‘Wild West‘ due to the level of violence. The 
mine and the neighbouring villages were situated in the confidence zone supposedly controlled by the 
heavily armed United Nations and French peacekeepers, but the region was under the control of 
different warlords (including some from Liberia and Sierra Leone). Over the years, the violent conflicts 
have reduced economic opportunities for people, and development agreements with the mine and gold 
panning are really the only key resource benefiting the region. 
3   The sources of the conflict around mining 
There are eight villages in the immediate vicinity of the concession area. Despite the compensation 
agreed for these villages due to the opening of the mine, the population and its customary leaders have 
never really accepted the fact that ‘their land’ no longer belongs to them. This frustration has always 
served as a stimulus for the creation of cyclical conflicts between the population and the SMI. 
This frustration has increased over the years, as local people from the Ity gold mine communities do not 
believe that they benefit from gold mining. They see the negative consequences of mining outweighing 
its potential advantages in their local areas. The villages neighbouring the mine have, up to now, barely 
benefited from the socio-economic impact of gold mining. Our 2017 survey shows that purchasing 
power of households is low: 53.9 per cent place their monthly expenses at between 0 and 50,000 CFA 
francs ($100), 31.8 per cent between 50,000 and 100,000 CFA francs ($100–200) and only 4.3 per cent 
spend between 100,000 and 150,000 CFA francs ($200–300) during the month. This is below the 
national monthly average household income of around $287 (GDP per capita purchasing power parity). 
The respondents also indicated that local food security has deteriorated over time as more lands are 
leased from farming for gold mining. 
In terms of food security, the main means of access to food for the household is the purchase of food 
and agricultural production for self-consumption, which, moreover, cannot cover all needs in this area. 
Some households have problems with food self-sufficiency and can go days without food. And this 
situation sometimes affects all members of the household. According to 53 per cent of the heads of 
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household surveyed, the level of food security has deteriorated since the post-electoral crisis in 2011. 
This is due to the high cost of living (37 per cent), low agricultural production (17 per cent) and scarcity 
of arable land (13 per cent). 
The main source of livelihood has been farming (cocoa and coffee, as well as subsistence agriculture – 
rice, manioc, banana etc.) and, to a lesser extent, fishing in the waters of the Cavally. According to our 
survey, agriculture accounts for 40 per cent of livelihoods. In addition to agriculture, trade and petty 
trading are also sources of income for households. Low agricultural production has forced 46 per cent 
of heads of households to change their economic activities. Interestingly, gold panning was not 
mentioned by the respondents as a means of subsistence for their households. There are of course 
many ways to explain this omission, and perhaps it is simply because it is an illegal or an informal 
practice that is secondary to other activities. Indeed, historically gold panning was done in addition to 
other activities as a way to compensate for the income deficits generated by agriculture in order to 
maintain the family balance.1 The following comments from the representative of the women of the 
village of Kouèpleu (35 years old) attest to this: ‘Before our parents exploited gold, there was a little bit, 
they mostly focused on agriculture. When money was not enough, they just exploited gold to support 
us. Gold is the wealth that spirits have given to our parents, so that everyone can use it so that their 
offspring can also benefit’ (Kouèpleu, 12 May 2017). 
The deterioration of the economic situation has recently led to an increase in gold panning. This has led 
to further tensions and conflict with the mining company because gold panning was taking place within 
the perimeter of the SMI concession area (Zénobe 2010). This has led to increased security of the mining 
space with the ever-growing presence of the police and the recruitment of a private security company, 
G4S, for controlling and protecting the mine area perimeter. 
4   The 2014 Mining Code and gold panning 
Prior to the Mining Code of 2014 and the implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) global standard, the governance system involved the central government and the 
company governing the operations of the mine. Relationships between mining companies and local 
people in mining communities were informal. The village communities started from a position where 
the mine assisted them in almost everything because the State was the sole stakeholder in the mine. 
The failure of the 1995 Mining Code to institute a legal framework for guiding intercommunity relations 
between the mining operator and the population favoured the social construction of a duty of assistance 
to the population by the mining authorities. It was based on the ideology of aid to the region. This 
ideology mobilised the former administrations towards more affective behaviour towards the local 
populations, resulting in social, health, educational and environmental assistance. 
A social security system of comprehensive care and prevention was established, which was free of 
charge. According to SMI (2012), 
The cost of essential drugs purchased by the SMI is CFAF 15,408,000 per year. Taking into 
account staff and residents, an average of nearly 12,941 patients benefit from this access to 
care each year. The number of patients breaks down as follows: 3921 patients from SMI staff, 
4268 patients from neighbouring villages, 4752 patients from SMI staff families and SMI 
subcontractors.  
                                                          
1 There is a broad literature on the importance of farming–mining linkages (see for example, Maconachie and 
Binns 2007). 
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Several educational infrastructures were built, including primary schools in all the affected 
villages, and sanitation, teachers’ housing, infirmaries and nurses’ housing, rural electrification 
etc. Village chiefs were consulted before any ‘important’ decisions were taken by the mine. In 
addition, local authorities and managers were provided with free fuel from the mine and other 
benefits related to their professional position and their social status. As one mine administrator 
said, 
In the past, if the prefect has to travel, he comes to the mine and parks his car, we fill it up, if 
the car breaks down, he comes here in the garage, we do all the repairs for free and he leaves... 
during political campaigns, ministers used to come here to take the money in order to pay for 
his oxen to go to the villages. 
(Zouan-Hounien, 11 May 2017) 
The implementation of the new Mining Code in 2014 has reconfigured these assistance mechanisms by 
reorienting them within a formal and institutional framework (Loi No. 2014-138). The Mining Code 
received an award for ‘best mining reforms’ at the 2014 ‘Mines and Money’ investors conference, 
showing how it is viewed as best policy and practice for good governance by the global mining 
community. 
The Mining Code 2014 tried to formalise relationships between mining companies and the local people 
through the creation of the Comité de Développement Local Minier. This committee now manages a 
local development fund based on 0.5 per cent of a mine’s annual turnover and is responsible for 
identifying the development projects for each year. These funds, coming from the mining company 
itself, are intended just for the areas that neighbour mining sites as a way of compensating communities 
that are affected, and for promoting development in these places. The mining company consults the 
CDLM when it is developing the annual development plan. At the time of research, the CDLM was not 
operating in Ity because of a dispute over its composition. Stakeholders have different interpretations 
of the composition, role and powers of the CDLM, which often gives rise to tensions. For example, one 
group believed that there should be political representatives to ensure its political interests, whereas 
another group wanted the chief of the canton to serve on the CDLM in addition to the village chiefs. 
This prompted a conflict of interests among the stakeholders, and it continues to undermine the setting 
up and functioning of the CDLM, the aim of which is to ensure effective, transparent and accountable 
governance of mining benefits for communities. 
Besides introducing the Mining Code, the central government has tried to control unregulated artisanal 
gold mining through a triennial programme (‘un programme triennal de rationalisation de l’orpaillage’). 
However, this programme has had limited impact because people are clearly unfamiliar with the 
procedures for obtaining the required gold mining permit. 
5   A mutually negotiated agreement 
To mitigate the conflict between the mining company and gold panners from the neighbouring villages, 
a mutually negotiated agreement between the management of the Ity mine and the affected villages 
was put into place. Within the concession area, the company has designated a smaller area for gold 
panning activity, 32ha of land. However, despite the granting of this space, the local communities still 
continue to enter the area of the mining concession for gold panning. A key focus of this paper is to 
understand the sociological reasons for the non-compliance with the negotiated solution between the 
affected villages and the mine management. It therefore addresses the question of the social logics of 
this non-compliance. The following specific questions were asked: Who are the real actors involved in 
the manifestation of the conflict related to non-compliance with the mutually negotiated agreement? 
  
 
6 
What are the ideological resources associated with non-compliance with this agreement? What is the 
underlying issue? 
6   The logics of non-compliance with the mutually negotiated 
agreement 
6.1   A cultural understanding of the perceived links between impoverishment and industrial mining 
In the social imaginaries of the various local communities, the arrival of the mining company is related 
to the deterioration of their access to livelihood and associated incomes. The Ity gold deposit, officially 
discovered by the Bureau Minier de la France Outre-mer (BUMIFOM) in the 1950s, was seen as the basis 
for the reconfiguration of the village social order. From 1991, industrial exploitation replaced artisanal 
exploitation owing to the legalised acquisition of land by SMI. This state of affairs is correlated with the 
loss of village land holdings, but explained through a cultural and spiritual lens. The communities 
consider intensive gold mining to be an activity that disrupts the balance with the forces of nature that 
are supposed to protect the village. In this sense, industrial exploitation has diverted the mining heritage 
from its original assignment, which was to be a complement to agricultural activities. This disruption 
has led to the ‘distancing’ of various guardian spirits. A 33-year-old gold digger said during the focus 
group organised in the village of Ouyatouo: 
Since the whites started mining gold there, it has never stopped. They only exploit, but we had 
that as a secondary good. Before, even when it rained, gold could be collected without effort. 
But now it’s difficult, the spirits have hidden the gold there. Like them they have machines to 
dig down there; we will search for ourselves too to be able to survive. 
(Ouyatouo, 18 May 2017) 
According to this logic, most of the soil is now impoverished owing to this spiritual disconnect. As a 
result, the parcel of land that has been allocated to them is socially represented as ‘unenriched’ and 
‘poor’. They therefore use the mine as a survival strategy. 
6.2   The non-transferability of land ownership as a strategy for legitimising non-compliance 
The non-transferability of land ownership is a second important ideological referent as further 
justification for non-compliance with the negotiated agreement. Indeed, the village chiefs and the 
representatives of the young people and women of the affected villages unanimously agree to recognise 
the ownership of the plots despite their allocation to the mining administration and the related 
compensation process. 
The village chief of Ity explained, 
You can see where the mine administration and equipment are located, these are our parents’ 
lands. They took all of it. We lost everything. Our women no longer have any fields. We 
ourselves are like in Guantanamo Bay on our own land. We don’t have an identity anymore, 
with that, they don’t want our children to go gold digging. But where do they want us to go? 
(Ity, 11 May 2017) 
According to the various representatives of the local community, these are the lands of their ancestors 
and, as such, land is non-transferable. It is the means by which villagers build their authority and social 
identity. Its ownership allows social relations to function because it promotes the maintenance of 
indigenous social positions and structures the spatial positions between indigenous people in the 
affected villages on the one hand and non-natives on the other. 
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The mining administration is formally recognised as the owner of the plots by the 2014 Mining Code. 
However, the local population, in their relationship with the mining administration, mobilise the 
customary ownership of the plots as a resource for obscuring relations of domination that are difficult 
to accept. In fact, this ideology functions as a factor in repositioning local communities in the governance 
of gold panning land parcels. It therefore legitimises their social status: that of landholder. 
Since the discovery of the Ity mining deposit, several successive operators have been granted control of 
the concession. However, the local people increasingly feel that this space is disconnected from them 
as these changes in administration take place without them. These negotiations between the State and 
mining companies take place in Abidjan Plateau, the main business centre located in the centre of the 
city of Abidjan, in the premises of the Ministry of Mines and Energy. However, one of the characteristics 
of territorial governance is the involvement of local communities, who want to participate in decision-
making processes and territorial projects (Torre 2012). In this respect, in response to what these local 
communities consider to be the fabrication of social remoteness in the gold land-parcel management 
process, they will proceed by imitation. This also involves forging partnerships with informal operators, 
defined as Ghanaian and Burkinabé non-indigenous people, whom young people from the eight 
impacted villages help to install on the mine plots as compensation for rent. Generally, these non-
indigenous people have sophisticated equipment such as dredges that reduce the difficulty of extracting 
ore. The possession of the equipment by these non-natives means that the natives work with them or 
often transfer the parcels of the mine to them in the form of a lease. 
In a public speech, a mine manager said, ‘You can’t search on the perimeters assigned to a mining 
company. Currently this is not the case here. But here you are dealing with illegal operators, you will 
find Ghanaians and Burkinabés, working on the sites, it is illegal exploitation, they even attack our 
perimeters’ (Zouan-Hounien, 17 May 2017). 
A spokesman for the village chief of Ouyatouo expressed a contrasting view, ‘At least the presence of 
these Ghanaians on our land allows our children to manage and have something to eat. This is in 
contrast to the mine company, which is installed on our land and refuses work to our children’ 
(Ouyatouo, 18 May 2017). 
The positioning of the mining company within the regulatory framework under the Mining Code (2014) 
is reinterpreted by the village populations as a mistrust of their social status as landowners. Villagers 
feel that the mine has obligations towards them because it is located on their land and mining makes 
the land uncultivatable. In fact, they see the company as having a perpetual duty to them. This generates 
demands that the new administration cannot always satisfy. As one of the villagers of Krozialé (30 years 
old) told us, ‘Before they were reprofiling the roads of our fields, now they have stopped. As a result, 
they engage in land reclaiming practices by investing in the mine plots to practise gold panning’ 
(Krozialé, 13 May 2017). 
The community relations manager for the mine explained, 
We can no longer honour a certain number of commitments that were made previously by the 
managing directors of the old mine since it did not obey any standards and that can be a source 
of conflict, since, for example, people no longer understand why, in the past, they only had to 
go to the mine to say, listen, do such things for us and the mine did them, but now the mine can 
no longer do that. 
(Zouan-Hounien, 17 May 2017) 
6.3   Circumventing the mutually negotiated agreement to challenge new hiring practices 
The arrival of the Endeavour Mining Financial Group in 2011 has led to a reconfiguration of the type of 
company. It has been established as a publicly traded administration to comply with national and 
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international standards defined by the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the EITI. 
And one of the major changes relates to work employment practices. 
The 2014 Mining Code (p. 4) stipulates that ‘an organisation’s responsibility for the impacts of its 
decisions and activities on the community and the environment, reflected in transparent and ethical 
behaviour, respects the laws in force and is compatible with national and international standards’. The 
Ivorian labour law states in Article 4: ‘subject to the provisions of the Code or any other legislative or 
regulatory text protecting women and children, as well as the provisions relating to the status of 
foreigners, no employer may take into account sex, age, national ascendancy, race, religion, political 
and religious opinion, social origin… with regard to, notably hiring’. 2 As the senior manager of the SMI 
responsible for local communities of villages impacted by mine activities said, ‘you cannot discriminate 
in any kind on the origin, ethnicity or political opinion of people when you recruit them’. 
In line with this perspective, Endeavour has decided to break with past recruitment practices that had 
been based on an informal standard. It had consisted of systematically recruiting the people from the 
eight villages as employees of the mine; at the time, most of the work involved manual labour. Changes 
to Endeavour’s recruitment practices have created barriers to hiring local workers. Tests are organised 
on the basis of competence, and proof of qualifications through diplomas and employment certificates 
is now required. In this respect, while recruitment is ostensibly ‘open’ to everyone according to the 
notes addressed to community leaders for the population of the eight affected villages, new 
technologies such as e-mails, Facebook and the internet are used to recruit the rest of the candidates. 
Therefore, in the absence of competence from the eight riverside villages, most of the applicants and 
recruits come from other areas of Côte d’Ivoire. 
Consequently, local communities perceive these new measures as barriers to entry for employment and 
a deliberate act to exclude local young people from work opportunities at the mine. This perception 
contributes to the de-legitimisation of the new mining administration and mobilises young people in 
these villages to gold pan on the mine site. As confirmed by the words of a person in charge of the town 
hall of Zouan-Hounien, 
For young people in the village who have not gone far with their schooling, we cannot pass on 
information when hiring on the internet, for young people who do not even have an e-mail... 
even those who do have one, it is at the last minute that they are informed, the time to collect 
the papers to apply, the deadline is over. With that, how are they not going to pan for gold on 
the mine site? 
(Zouan-Hounien, 11 May 2017) 
6.4   Non-compliance with the agreement as a social response to the ‘statutory deconstruction’ of 
customary chiefs by Endeavour Mining 
On the basis of the survey data collected in seven affected villages, it appears that the village social 
order is built on three sociological entities. Respect for customs and traditions, respect for local deities, 
especially ancestors and spirits in the forests, and respect for locally legitimate hierarchy, in this case 
village chiefs and land and tribe chiefs. This is why the balance of social interactions is based on the 
reciprocal relationship between the spatial–physical environment, the social structures that shape this 
environment and the actions embedded in these social structures (Castells 2007, cited by Frey 2012). In 
the cross-sectional analysis of the data, one of these social structures seems to have been damaged in 
the relationship with the new mine administration. This is the legitimacy of village leaders. 
                                                          
2 Labour Law No. 2015-532 of 20 July 2015 quoted in Journal officiel de la république de Côte d’Ivoire, 14 September 
2015, No. 74, p.1198. 
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According to the information gathered, the villagers criticise the ‘unilateral’ decision-making of the 
current mine manager. His firmness and decision-making skills have earned him a reputation as an 
uncompromising man. So much so that his name was transformed by the nickname ‘arm wrestling’ in 
order to manifest this state of affairs. According to the local community leaders, the new manager no 
longer involves village chiefs in important decisions concerning their respective communities. The youth 
from the eight impacted villages and the customary chiefs therefore deplore the absence of a 
permanent and direct intermediation framework beyond the CDLM. When a conflict occurs the mine 
refers it to the prefectural authorities rather than dialoguing with the village leaders. ‘The use of these 
prefectural authorities (prefect, sub-prefect) that the villagers consider to be “accomplices” of the State 
is reinterpreted as an attack on the legitimacy of the customary chiefs as a key institution to manage 
conflict situations,’ exclaimed the village chief of Krozialé (13 May 2017). The dismissal of 33 employees 
of the mining company led the population to begin a strike in February 2017. According to the youth 
leader of the village Floleu, ‘What the mining manager did there is not right, he did not even consult the 
village chiefs before firing our children’, and ‘the mining manager has the bullshit, he makes the 
decisions, he doesn’t consult anyone, our leaders are no longer respected’. And an agent of the 
prefecture of Zouan-Hounien said 
The last strike, the community leaders told the director not to fire the young people, but he 
fired them anyway. If it was in the old administration, we would say that he disobeyed the chief, 
we just have to pay so much, so much and so much. In the old days, we paid, but today we no 
longer pay. 
 (Krozialé, 13 May 2017) 
This frustration is reinvested as a resource for manipulating youth by their community leaders. From 
then on, young people engaged in activities of defiance of the mine through strikes and occupying the 
mining concession for gold panning purposes. The activity is carried out in full view of the village and 
administrative authorities, as evidenced by the words of a mining company official: 
Unfortunately, we are facing an attack on the mining perimeter and the consequences are 
dramatic, they come to our site and if they die, the communities accuse us, but if they do not 
die, we do not say anything and the mine bears additional costs in terms of security. The mine 
loses a lot of money to protect itself from the attack of gold panners. And when it’s like that, 
we hear that the objective is to get the mine out of there, we’re going to go and do some gold 
panning. 
(Zouan-Hounien, 18 May 2017) 
These practices are a social response to what the villagers perceive as a ‘statutory deconstruction’ of 
traditional chiefs by Endeavour mining, as confirmed by the canton chief of the eight affected villages: 
‘The young people intervene on our behalf, themselves they do not know but, sometimes, when things 
get hot, we manipulate them. They themselves don’t know why they’re here. This is our policy, we 
encourage young people’ (Trogleu 1, 12 May 2017). 
5   Conclusion 
The lack of respect by the local population for the agreement between itself and Endeavour Mining  is 
linked to the former’s perception of formal management as a process of manufacturing social distance 
in the governance of the gold plots. The study showed that the communities’ non-compliance with a 
mutually negotiated agreement with the mining company lies in the reconfiguration of the social 
relations between these actors. The inclusion of the new mining administration in the logic of the 2014 
Mining Code created a break with the informal social framework that had structured these relationships. 
  
 
10 
On this basis, the mine is considered ‘illegitimate’ on the land of these communities. This paper focuses 
on one aspect of the conflicting relationships to mining projects in the community of Ity. As a follow-up 
to the study, it is important to focus on the local population’s perception of the 2014 Mining Code. This 
code institutes the CDLM as a formal simulacrum of this previously informal social framework. 
Overall, one can see that the formalisation of rights creates more conflict and tensions with local 
communities. In the particular case of Côte d’Ivoire, this can be further explained by the fact that the 
mining issues are related to a broader and unresolved debate on land tenure (Mitchell 2014). Relying 
on certain conceptual uncertainties used by the Mining Code, in particular the notions of ‘purging’ 
customary rights and ‘compensation’, the populations mobilise this ideological resource to (re)position 
themselves as landholders even though the land has been granted to the mining company. In fact, the 
failure to respect the agreement between these two actors has connections with disputed 
interpretations of the 1998 land legislation, transforming customary rights into ‘modern’ property 
rights. For local communities, individual land ownership, however defined, is dependent on community 
(village) ownership (Koné 2006; Diop et al. 2015; INADES 2015). As such, the land cannot be transferred 
because it belongs to an entire family, a tribe or a lineage. For Diop et al. (2015: 37), ‘Individual property 
rights do not exist in the customary land system. The whole challenge of the evolution of the land system 
is there: the transformation of the right of use into individual property rights and their formalisation.’ 
INADES (2015: 19) states that ‘Customary land management is therefore closely linked to the idea of 
non-transferability: “One does not sell land”; it is a "common good".’ This paper has therefore 
highlighted the limits of a particular framing of sustainability around good governance as a mechanism 
to address State–community–mining relations and its inability to address the underlying and structural 
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire around land and the broader politics around resource access and distribution. 
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This paper examines the exploitation and management  
of gold mining in the western region of Côte d’Ivoire and the 
associated local social tensions and conflicts. Taking a 
historical sociological analysis, the paper shows how good 
governance and conflict resolution initiatives (and in 
particular the 2014 Mining Code and the subsequent locally 
mediated governance arrangement), combined with the 
privatisation of the mine and its security, are leading  
to conflict.
The study, which is predominantly qualitative, employs a 
mixed-methods methods approach, drawing upon direct 
observation, 20 semi-structured interviews for stakeholder 
mapping and ten focus groups with gold panners, mine 
managers and local village populations. Quantitative 
analysis was conducted with 154 heads of households in the 
project area, i.e. the eight villages directly affected by gold 
mining activities. The content analysis revealed that the 
rationale for expropriation during the initial phase of mining 
was never accepted at the local level for economic and 
spiritual reasons. This resistance has increased following the 
establishment of a new mining administration and the new 
mining code.
